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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT                           
_____________ 
 
No. 13-2458 
_____________ 
 
LISA MCKENNA, 
                     Appellant 
 
v. 
 
HEALTHEASE, INC.; LOCKHEED MARTIN CORPORATION;  
ERIC MAMON; ARMAND TECCO  
_____________ 
        
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the  Eastern District of  Pennsylvania 
District Court No. 2-10-cv-03940 
District Judge: The Honorable Berle M. Schiller 
                               
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a) 
July 7, 2014 
 
Before: SMITH, VANASKIE, and SHWARTZ, Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: July 15, 2014) 
                              
_____________________ 
 
OPINION 
_____________________ 
 
SMITH, Circuit Judge. 
  
 Lisa McKenna (“McKenna”) appeals from an order of the United States 
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania granting summary judgment 
to defendants Healthease, Inc. (“Healthease”), Armand Tecco (“Tecco”), and 
Lockheed Martin Corporation (“Lockheed Martin”) in McKenna’s suit for gender 
and age discrimination. For the reasons set forth below, we will affirm. 
 McKenna is a woman who, at all times relevant to this suit, was over the age 
of forty. Tecco is the owner of Healthease, a company that provides onsite fitness 
services to businesses. Pertinent to the allegations in this appeal, Healthease 
entered into a contract with Lockheed Martin to provide onsite fitness services at 
Lockheed Martin’s corporate facility in King of Prussia, Pennsylvania.  
 Healthease hired McKenna in September 2008 and assigned her to work as 
the fitness manager at Lockheed Martin’s facility. In January 2009, Tecco and 
another Healthease employee, Eric Mamon, informed McKenna that her 
employment was being terminated.  
 On July 10, 2009, McKenna filed for chapter 7 protection in the United 
States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of California. See Chapter 7 
Voluntary Petition, In re Lisa R. McKenna, No. 8:09-bk-16886ES (Bankr. C.D. 
Cal. July 10, 2009), ECF No. 1. McKenna did not list a discrimination claim as an 
asset on her bankruptcy schedules, nor did she otherwise disclose such a claim to 
  
the Bankruptcy Court. On December 16, 2009, the Bankruptcy Court issued a 
discharge to McKenna and closed her bankruptcy proceeding.  
 In 2010, McKenna filed this lawsuit, alleging gender discrimination under 
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., 
age discrimination in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
(“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., and state law discrimination claims under the 
Pennsylvania Human Relations Act (“PHRA”), 43 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 951 et 
seq. Her complaint sought both money damages and injunctive relief. 
Defendants moved for dismissal, arguing that McKenna lacked standing to 
bring claims for damages because the bankruptcy trustee, not McKenna, was the 
correct party in interest to bring such claims. On December 5, 2012, McKenna’s 
counsel advised the District Court that the bankruptcy trustee would be seeking to 
reopen McKenna’s bankruptcy proceeding and obtain permission from the 
Bankruptcy Court to pursue McKenna’s discrimination claims. On January 15, 
2013, the District Court ruled that the bankruptcy trustee, and not McKenna, was 
the appropriate party to bring these claims. The District Court gave McKenna until 
February 25, 2013 to reopen her bankruptcy proceeding and substitute the trustee 
into this discrimination suit.  
 McKenna did not substitute the trustee by this deadline. Rather, on February 
25, 2013, the trustee submitted a motion to the District Court, indicating that 
  
McKenna’s bankruptcy proceeding had not been reopened but that the trustee “will 
seek to move the Bankruptcy Court for an order reopening the case and for 
reappointment of the Trustee.”  Request of Jeffrey I. Golden, Former Chapter 7 
Trustee for the Bankruptcy Estate of Lisa McKenna for Order Not Dismissing 
Pending Litigation at 2, McKenna v. Healthease, Inc., No. 2:10-cv-03940-BMS 
(E.D. Pa. Feb. 25, 2013), ECF No. 59. The same day, February 25, 2013, the 
trustee filed a motion in the Bankruptcy Court seeking to reopen McKenna’s case 
pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). See Motion to Reopen Chapter 7 Case, In re Lisa 
R. McKenna, No. 8:09-bk-16886ES (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Feb. 25, 2013), ECF No. 12. 
On March 25, 2013, the United States Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of 
California granted the motion to reopen McKenna’s bankruptcy case. However, 
even after the Bankruptcy Court reopened the case, neither McKenna nor the 
trustee filed a motion or took other action to substitute the trustee into McKenna’s 
discrimination suit. 
 While the efforts to reopen the bankruptcy proceeding were ongoing, 
defendants filed motions for summary judgment. McKenna opposed the summary 
judgment motions, arguing that the District Court should grant her leave to conduct 
additional discovery pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d). On April 
19, 2013, the District Court ruled on the motions for summary judgment, granting 
  
summary judgment in favor of the defendants and denying McKenna’s request for 
leave to conduct additional discovery. McKenna then brought this timely appeal.
1
 
 Upon reviewing the record before us, we conclude that the District Court did 
not err in granting summary judgment to defendants. First, for the reasons stated by 
the District Court, we agree that Lockheed Martin was not McKenna’s employer 
and thus cannot be liable for McKenna’s claims under Title VII, ADEA, or PHRA. 
Additionally, we also agree with the District Court’s decision to grant summary 
judgment to Healthease and Tecco because McKenna failed to make out a prima 
facie case of either age or gender discrimination. We further agree with the District 
Court that, even if McKenna had made a prima facie case to support her claims, 
Healthcare and Tecco are entitled to summary judgment because McKenna failed 
to demonstrate pretext.  
 Additionally, after a thorough review of the record evidence, we conclude 
that the District Court did not abuse its discretion in declining to grant McKenna 
leave to conduct additional discovery instead of ruling on the summary judgment 
motions. We agree with the District Court that McKenna offered no convincing 
justification for her failure to conduct this discovery earlier in the litigation and did 
                                                 
1
  The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of the District Court’s grant of summary judgment is 
plenary. Mikula v. Allegheny Cnty. of Pa., 583 F.3d 181, 185 (3d Cir. 2009) (per curiam). We 
review the District Court’s ruling on the motion for additional discovery pursuant to Rule 56(d) 
for abuse of discretion. Murphy v. Millennium Radio Grp. LLC, 650 F.3d 295, 310 (3d Cir. 
2011). 
  
not explain how such additional discovery was essential to her opposition to 
summary judgment. Moreover, we note that McKenna’s request—consisting of an 
unsigned declaration of her counsel offering only conclusory statements that the 
additional discovery was essential to her defense, see J.A. 258–61—did not 
comply with the requirements of Rule 56(d). See Lunderstadt v. Colafella, 885 
F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir. 1989) (“Our case law makes clear that a [Rule 56(d)] motion 
must identify with specificity what particular information is sought; how, if 
uncovered, it would preclude summary judgment; and why it has not previously 
been obtained.”) (emphasis added); Radich v. Goode, 886 F.2d 1391, 1394 (3d Cir. 
1989) (holding an unverified memorandum from a party’s attorney is insufficient 
to satisfy the affidavit requirement of the rule); see also St. Surin v. Virgin Islands 
Daily News, Inc., 21 F.3d 1309, 1313 (3d Cir. 1994) (emphasizing that our 
Circuit’s case law “underscore[s] the benefits of technical compliance” with the 
affidavit requirements of Rule 56(d)). Thus, it was not an abuse of discretion for 
the District Court to deny McKenna’s request for additional discovery. 
Finally, we reject McKenna’s contention that the District Court abused its 
discretion in not granting additional time for the trustee to file a motion to 
substitute into this action. The record reveals that McKenna failed to take action to 
substitute the trustee despite ample opportunity from the District Court. 
Regardless, the District Court’s comprehensive, well-reasoned opinion 
  
demonstrates that because McKenna did not meet her burden of production on her 
discrimination claims, her reluctance to effectuate substitution had no bearing on 
the outcome of this case. 
Accordingly, we will affirm.
